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Abstract
We show that RT(2, 4) cannot be proved with one typical applica-
tion of RT(2, 2) in an intuitionistic extension of RCA0 to higher types,
but that this does not remain true when the law of the excluded middle
is added. The argument uses Kohlenbach’s axiomatization of higher
order reverse mathematics, results related to modified reducibility, and
a formalization of Weihrauch reducibility.
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One of the questions motivating the exploration of uniform reductions
in the article of Dorais, Dzhafarov, Hirst, Mileti, and Shafer [4] was: Is it
possible to prove Ramsey’s theorem for pairs and four colors from a single
use of Ramsey’s theorem for pairs and two colors? Not surprisingly, the
answer depends on the base system chosen, as shown in §3 below. Our
approach utilizes a formalization of Weihrauch reducibility described by Hirst
at Dagstuhl Seminar 15392 [1], based on higher order reverse mathematics
as axiomatized by Kohlenbach [9]. This choice of formalization, along with
the choice of different base systems, yields results that differ from those in
recent closely related work of Kuyper [10]. We discuss these differences at
the end of Section 2.
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1 Formal Weihrauch reduction
The counting of theorem applications in later sections relies in part on the
close connection between proofs in some systems of arithmetic and Weihrauch
reduction. This relationship is also central to the arguments of Kuyper [10]
Rather than formalizing Weihrauch reduction by means of indices (as in [10]),
we work in extensions of reverse mathematics axiom systems [11] to higher
types, first formulated by Kohlenbach [9]. These systems have variables for
numbers (type 0 objects), functions from numbers to numbers (type 1 ob-
jects encoding sets of numbers), and for functions from type 1 functions to
numbers, type 1 functions to type 1 functions, and so on. In Kohlenbach’s
terminology, RCAω
0
consists of Ê-HA
ω
↾ plus the law of the excluded middle
and QF-AC1,0, a restricted choice scheme. The system Ê-HA
ω
↾ is an axiomati-
zation of intuitionistic Heyting arithmetic in all finite types, with restricted
induction and primitive recursion. For full details, see Kohlenbach [8, §3.4].
The choice scheme QF-AC1,0 asserts
∀x∃nA(x, n) → ∃ϕ∀xA(x, ϕ(x))
for A quantifier free, where x is a set variable, n is a number variable, and ϕ
is a variable for functions mapping sets to numbers. To make the typography
more compact, we will use letters between i and n to denote number variables,
letters following s in the alphabet as set variables, and greek letters for various
functionals. We also use iRCAω
0
to denote the intuitionistic system arising
from omitting the law of the excluded middle from RCAω
0
. A concise outline
of the axioms for RCAω
0
can be found in the article of Hirst and Mummert [6].
Weihrauch reducibility is a computability theoretic approach to measur-
ing relative uniform strength. See Brattka and Gherardi [2] for an exten-
sive survey. We adopt the notion of reduction of problems, as used by
Dorais [3] and Dorais et al. [4]. A problem P is a formula of the form
∀x(p1(x) → ∃y p2(x, y)), asserting that whenever x is an instance of the
problem then there is a solution y for x. Suppose P:∀x(p1(x) → ∃y p2(x, y))
and Q:∀u(q1(u) → ∃v q2(u, v)) are problems. We say Q is Weihrauch re-
ducible to P, and write Q ≤W P, if there are computable functions ϕ and ψ
such that the following hold:
• If u is an instance of Q then ϕ(u) is an instance of P, that is:
q1(u)→ p1(ϕ(u))
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• If y is a solution of ϕ(u), then ψ(u, y) is a solution of Q, that is:
p2(ϕ(u), y)→ q2(u, ψ(u, y))
Consequently, in the language of RCAω
0
we can formalize Q ≤W P as:
∃ϕ∃ψ∀u (q1(u)→ (p1(ϕ(u)) ∧ ∀y[p2(ϕ(u), y)→ q2(u, ψ(u, y))]))
We will be working in subsystems of higher order reverse mathematics, so
we use Q ≤W P as an abbreviation for the formula above, despite the fact
that the leading quantifiers in the formula are not explicitly restricted to
computable functionals. When working in iRCAω
0
, for many choices of Q and
P this is a faithful translation, as shown by Corollary 5. However, in the
classical setting, RCAω
0
⊢ Q ≤W P may not imply Q ≤W P, as shown by the
example following Corollary 5.
2 Counting theorem applications
In this section, we show that formalized Weihrauch reducibility is closely
related to the structure of some intuitionistic proofs.
Definition 1. Suppose T is a theory and P:∀x(p1(x) → ∃y p2(x, y)) and
Q:∀u(q1(u)→ ∃v q2(u, v)) are problems. We say T proves Q with one typical
use of P if the following two sentences hold:
(1) For a variable u there is a term xu such that using only axioms of T
and the assumption q1(u), and with no applications of generalization to
u or any variables appearing free in xu, there is a deduction of p1(xu).
(2) For a previously unused constant symbol y0, there is a term vxu,y0 such
that using only axioms of T and the assumption p2(xu, y0), and with
no applications of generalization to u or any variable appearing free in
xu or vxu,y0, there is a deduction of q2(u, vxu,y0).
Informally, this definition says that given an instance of the problem Q,
there is an instance xu of the problem P such that if there is a solution y0
to xu then there is a solution vxu,y0 to Q. The restrictions on generalization
insure the validity of applications of the deduction theorem in the proof of
the following lemma.
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Lemma 2. Suppose T is a theory that includes intuitionistic predicate calcu-
lus, P:∀x(p1(x) → ∃y p2(x, y)) and Q:∀u(q1(u) → ∃v q2(u, v)) are problems,
and T proves Q with one typical use of P. Then T proves:
∀u∃x∀y∃v(q1(u)→ (p1(x) ∧ (p2(x, y)→ q2(u, v))))
Proof. Given a proof of Q in T with one typical use of P, build a new proof
as follows. Assume q1(u) as a hypothesis and, applying sentence (1) of Def-
inition 1, emulate the given proof to construct a term xu with p1(xu). Let
y0 be a new constant symbol and assume p2(xu, y0) as a hypothesis. By sen-
tence (2) of Definition 1, we can find a term vxu,y0 and prove q2(u, vxu,y0).
One application of the deduction theorem yields p2(xu, y0) → q2(u, vxu,y0).
By ∧-introduction [7, §19, Ax. 3] followed by the deduction theorem, we
have:
q1(u)→ (p1(xu) ∧ (p2(xu, y0) → q2(u, vxu,y0))).
Note that xu depends only on u and vxu,y0 depends only on y0 and xu. Alter-
nating applications of ∃-introduction [7, §32, fla. 68] and ∀-introduction [7,
§32, fla. 64] yield
∀u∃x∀y∃v(q1(u)→ (p1(x) ∧ (p2(x, y)→ q2(u, v))))
as desired.
A formula is ∃-free if it is built from prime (that is, atomic) formulas
using only universal quantification and the connectives ∧ and →. Here, the
symbol ⊥ is considered prime, and ¬A is an abbreviation of A→ ⊥, so ∃-free
formulas may include both ⊥ and ¬. Troelstra’s [12] collection Γ1 consists
of those formulas defined inductively by the following:
• All prime formulas are elements of Γ1.
• If A and B are in Γ1, then so are A ∧ B, A ∨B, ∀xA, and ∃xA.
• If A is ∃-free and B is in Γ1 then ∃xA → B is in Γ1, where ∃x may
represent a block of existential quantifiers.
Theorem 3. Suppose P:∀x(p1(x) → ∃y p2(x, y)) and Q:∀u(q1(u)→ ∃v q2(u, v))
are problems and the formula q1(u) → (p1(x) ∧ [p2(x, y) → q2(u, v)]), abbre-
viated as R(x, y, u, v), is in Γ1. Then iRCA
ω
0
⊢ ∀u∃x∀y∃vR(x, y, u, v) if and
only if iRCAω
0
⊢ Q ≤W P.
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Proof. To prove the implication from left to right, suppose P, Q, and R are as
hypothesized, and iRCAω
0
⊢ ∀u∃x∀y∃vR(x, y, u, v). The proof of Lemma 3.9
of Hirst and Mummert [6] also holds for iRCAω
0
, so by two applications of that
lemma, there are terms xu and vxu,y such that iRCA
ω
0
⊢ ∀u∀yR(xu, y, u, vxu,y).
iRCAω
0
proves existence of functionals ϕ(u) = xu and ψ(u, y) = vxu,y, so
iRCAω
0
proves:
∀u∀y(q1(u)→ (p1(ϕ(u)) ∧ [p2(ϕ(u), y)→ q2(u, ψ(u, y))]))
which is equivalent to Q ≤W P by intuitionistic predicate calculus via [7, §35,
fla. 95], [7, §35, fla. 89], and ∃-introduction [7, §32, fla. 68].
Note that the proof of Lemma 3.9 of [6] is based on versions of the sound-
ness theorem for modified realizability, which appears as Theorem 5.8 of
Kohlenbach [8] and Theorem 3.4.5 of Troelstra [12], and conversion lemmas
for modified reducibility, Lemma 5.20 of Kohlenbach [8] and Lemma 3.6.5
of Troelstra [12]. The conversion lemmas are restricted to formulas in Γ1, ne-
cessitating the inclusion of this restriction as a hypothesis for this argument.
To prove the converse, suppose iRCAω
0
⊢ Q ≤W P. Thus, by our formal-
ization adopted in section §1, iRCAω
0
proves the existence of functionals ϕ
and ψ satisfying
∀u(q1(u)→ (p1(ϕ(u)) ∧ ∀y[p2(ϕ(u), y)→ q2(u, ψ(u, y))]))
By intuitionistic predicate calculus [7, §35, fla. 89] and [7, §35, fla. 95], we
can move the universal quantifier on y to the front of the formula. Applying
appropriate quantifier elimination followed by quantifier introduction yields
∀u∃x∀y∃vR(x, y, u, v).
As a corollary, we can show a close relationship between intuitionistic
proofs and formal Weihrauch reducibility in intuitionistic systems.
Corollary 4. Suppose P, Q and R satisfy the hypotheses in Theorem 3. Then
iRCAω
0
proves Q with one typical use of P if and only if iRCAω
0
⊢ Q ≤W P.
Proof. The forward implication follows immediately from Lemma 2 and The-
orem 3. To prove the converse, suppose iRCAω
0
proves the existence of func-
tions ϕ and ψ witnessing Q ≤W P. Then ϕ(u) satisfies sentence (1) of Defini-
tion 1, so p1(ϕ(u)). Assume the single use of P given by p2(ϕ(u), y0). Because
Q ≤W P, we have q2(u, ψ(u, y0)), completing a proof satisfying sentence (2)
of Definition 1.
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Theorem 3 also allows us to show that formal Weihrauch reducibility
proved in iRCAω
0
is often a faithful representation of actual Weihrauch re-
ducibility.
Corollary 5. Suppose P, Q and R satisfy the hypotheses in Theorem 3. If
iRCAω
0
⊢ Q ≤W P, then Q ≤W P.
Proof. For P, Q and R as hypothesized, if iRCAω
0
⊢ Q ≤W P then by The-
orem 3, iRCAω
0
⊢ ∀u∃x∀y∃vR(x, y, u, v). As in the proof of Theorem 3,
this means there are terms xu and vxu,y in the language of iRCA
ω
0
such that
iRCAω
0
⊢ ∀u∀yR(xu, y, u, vxu,y). Thus in any model of iRCA
ω
0
based on ω
and the power set of ω, where the basic arithmetic function symbols and the
combinators have their usual interpretations, the interpretations of the func-
tionals λu.xu and λ(xu, y).vxu,y (that is, ϕ and ψ as in the proof of Theorem 3)
will be computable functionals witnessing Q ≤W P.
Corollary 5 does not hold if iRCAω
0
is replaced by RCAω
0
. For example,
suppose P is the trivial problem defined by using 0 = 0 for both p1 and p2.
Thus every set is an acceptable input for P, and every set is a solution of P for
any input. To define the problem Q, let T be an infinite computable binary
tree (all nodes labeled 0 or 1) with no infinite computable path. Viewing an
input u as a function from N to N, we may interpret u as a sequence of zeros
and ones by identifying u(n) with 0 if u(n) = 0 and identifying u(n) with 1 if
u(n) 6= 0. Let q1 be 0 = 0 so every input is acceptable for Q. Let q2(u, v) say
that either v(0) = 0 and p(n) = v(n+1) is an infinite path in T , or v(0) > 0
and 〈u(0), . . . u(v(0))〉 /∈ T . Since T is ∆0
1
definable, q2(u, v) can be written
as a Π0
1
formula.
Working in RCAω
0
, we will prove that ∃ψ∀u q2(u, ψ(u)). By the law of
the excluded middle, either T has an infinite path or it doesn’t, so either
∃p∀n 〈p(0), . . . p(n)〉 ∈ T or ∀p∃n 〈p(0), . . . p(n)〉 /∈ T . In the first case, choose
an infinite path p0 and define ψ to be the constant functional that maps each
input to the sequence 0 followed by p0. In the second case, let ψ map each
u to the function that always takes the value 1 + µm(〈u(0), . . . u(m)〉 /∈ T ),
so for each u and n, ψ(u)(n) is a positive witness that u is not an infinite
path. In either case, ∀u q2(u, ψ(u)), as desired. Consequently, the identity
functional ϕ trivially witnesses
∀u(0 = 0→ (0 = 0 ∧ ∀y(0 = 0 → q2(u, ψ(u))))),
so RCAω
0
proves that Q ≤W P.
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Turning to the computability theoretic framework, we will show that Q is
not Weihrauch reducible to to P. To see this, suppose by way of contradiction
that ϕ and ψ are computable functionals witnessing Q ≤W P. Because P is
trivial, ∅ (the constant 0 function) is a solution of ϕ(u), so for all u, ψ(u, ∅)
is a solution of Q. By Ko¨nig’s Lemma, let u0 be an infinite path through
T . Because there is no witness that u0 is not an infinite path, we must have
ψ(u0, ∅)(0) = 0. The functional ψ is computable, so for some finite k, if u is
any extension of 〈u0(0), . . . u0(k)〉, then ψ(u, ∅)(0) = 0. Choose a computable
sequence s0 such that s0 extends 〈u0(0), . . . u0(k)〉. Then ψ(s0, ∅) is a solution
of Q and ψ(s0, ∅)(0) = 0, so v0 defined by v0(n) = ψ(s0, ∅)(n+1) is an infinite
path through T . But v0 is computable, contradicting the choice of T and
completing the example.
We close this section by comparing Corollary 4 with Theorem 7.1 of
Kuyper [10]. The results are similar in that each states the equivalence
of the existence of a formalized Weihrauch reduction with the existence of
a restricted resource proof of a related formula. Neither result implies the
other, however. On one hand, Kuyper’s results assume Markov’s Principle
in the base system, while ours do not. On the other hand, the class of pairs
of problems P and Q such that iRCAω
0
proves Q with one typical use of P
is a proper subclass of those for which (EL0 + MP)
∃αa proves P′ → Q′ (in
the sense of Kuyper [10]). This is an immediate consequence of Corollary 4,
Theorem 7.1 of Kuyper [10], and the following theorem.
Theorem 6. Suppose P, Q and R satisfy the hypotheses of Theorem 3. If
iRCAω
0
⊢ Q ≤W P, then there are standard natural number indices e0 and e1
such that RCA0 proves that e0 and e1 witness that Q Weihrauch reduces to P
as formalized in Theorem 7.1 of Kuyper [10]. The converse of this implication
fails.
Proof. Suppose P, Q and R satisfy the hypotheses of Theorem 3. Note that
the formalization of Q ≤W P in iRCA
ω
0
is in Γ1. By the intuitionistic analog
of Lemma 3.9 of Hirst and Mummert [6], there are terms in the language
of iRCAω
0
corresponding to the functionals witnessing Q ≤W P. The desired
indices can be calculated from these terms.
To prove that the converse fails, let P be the trivial problem ∀x(0 = 0→
∃y (0 = 0)) and let Q be the problem
∀u(0 = 0→ ∃v(∀n u(n) = 0 ∨ ∃n u(n) 6= 0)).
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Note that P, Q, and the associated formula R satisfy the hypotheses of Theo-
rem 3. In iRCAω
0
, Q ≤W P implies ∀u(∀n u(n) = 0∨ ∃n u(n) 6= 0)). Because
this conclusion (a form of the Lesser Principle of Omniscience) is not intu-
itionistically valid, iRCAω
0
does not prove Q ≤W P. On the other hand, for
any indices e0 and e1, the classical system RCA0 proves
∀u(0 = 0→ (0 = 0 → (0 = 0∧ ∀y(0 = 0 → (∀n u(n) = 0∨ ∃n u(n) 6= 0))))),
so for any choice of indices, RCA0 proves that Q Weihrauch reduces to P in
the sense of Theorem 7.1 of Kuyper [10].
In light of the preceding example, it would be nice to know if this dis-
tinction between the formalizations of Weihrauch reducibility holds for more
combinatorially interesting choices of P and Q. That is, can we find natural
choices of P and Q such that Q is not a theorem of RCA0, RCA0 proves Q
assuming P, (EL0 +MP)
∃αa proves P′ → Q′, and iRCAω
0
cannot prove Q with
one typical use of P?
Unlike our results, the results of Kuyper [10] are not restricted to formulas
in Γ1, in part due to his utilization of the Kuroda negative translation. We
wonder whether similar methods can extend the results of this paper and our
previous results [6] to a wider class of formulas.
3 Ramsey’s theorem
We can use the preceding results to address our question about proofs of
Ramsey’s theorem. Let RT(2, 4) denote the following formulation of Ram-
sey’s theorem for pairs and four colors: If f : [N]2 → 4, then there is an
infinite x ⊂ N and an i < 4 such that f([x]2) = i. The set x is called
monochromatic. Similarly, RT(2, 2) denotes Ramsey’s theorem for pairs and
two colors.
For any k, we can formalize RT(2, k) as a particularly simple Π1
2
formula.
In the higher order axiom systems described by Kohlenbach [9], all higher
order objects are functions, with subsets of N being encoded by characteristic
functions or by enumerations. Pairs of natural numbers can be encoded by
a single natural number, so any function from N into N (that is, any type
1 object) can be viewed as a function from [N]2 into N. By composition
with a truncation function tn defined by tn(m) = m if m < n and tn(m) = 0
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otherwise, we may view any type 1 function as a map from [N]2 into n. Using
these notions, we can formalize RT(2, 4) as
∀f∃x∀m(x(m) < x(m′) ∧ ∀0 < i < j < m(t4(f(x(i), x(j))) = x(0))).
Formalized in this fashion, RT(2, 4) is in Γ1 and its matrix (the portion begin-
ning with ∀m) is ∃-free. If we like, we could write it as ∀f(0 = 0 → ∃x(. . . ))
to coincide with the ∀x(p1 → ∃y p2) problem format. Using this formula-
tion for P:RT(2, 2) and Q:RT(2, 4), the predicate R as in the statement of
Theorem 3 is in Γ1.
Consider the following well-known proof of RT(2, 4) from two applications
of RT(2, 2). Given f : [N]2 → 4, define g1 : [N]
2 → 2 by setting g1(n,m) = 1
if f(n,m) > 1 and g1(n,m) = 0 otherwise. Applying RT(2, 2), let x =
{x0, x1, . . . } be an infinite monochromatic set for g1. Note that f([x]
2) is
either contained in {0, 1} or contained in {2, 3}. Define g2 : [N]
2 → 2 by
g2(n,m) = 1 if f(xn, xm) is odd and g2(n,m) = 0 otherwise. Applying
RT(2, 2) a second time, let y be an infinite monochromatic set for g2. Then
z = {xm | m ∈ y} is an infinite monochromatic set for f , completing the
proof of RT(2, 4). This proof that RT(2, 2) implies RT(2, 4) can be carried
out in iRCAω
0
. However, our work from previous sections shows that the
second use of RT(2, 2) cannot be eliminated.
Theorem 7. iRCAω
0
cannot prove RT(2, 4) with one typical use of RT(2, 2).
Proof. As noted in the second paragraph of this section, for our formulation
of RT(2, 2) and RT(2, 4), P, Q, and R satisfy the hypotheses of Theorem 3.
By Corollary 3.4 of Dorais et al. [4], RT(2, 4) 6≤W RT(2, 2). By Corollary 5,
iRCAω
0
6⊢ RT(2, 4) ≤W RT(2, 2). By Corollary 4, iRCA
ω
0
does not prove
RT(2, 4) with one typical use of RT(2, 2).
Theorem 3.3 of Hirschfeldt and Jockusch [5] asserts that if j, k, n ∈ ω sat-
isfy the inequalities n ≥ 1 and k > j ≥ 2, then RT(n, k) 6≤W RT(n, j). They
note that this result was also proved independently by Patey and by Brattka
and Rakotoniaina. Substituting this result for the use of Corollary 3.4 in the
proof of Theorem 7 yields the following extension.
Corollary 8. If j, k, n ∈ ω satisfy n ≥ 1 and k > j ≥ 2, then iRCAω
0
cannot
prove RT(n, k) with one typical use of RT(n, j).
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Returning to our original discussion of Ramsey’s theorem pairs, we next
show that RT(2, 4) can be proved with one typical use of RT(2, 2) in systems
such as RCA0 that include the law of the excluded middle. This somewhat
counterintuitive result relies on the following definition.
Definition 9. (RCA0) Suppose f : [N]
2 → 4. A set x is 2-mono for f if there
is a set {i, j} ⊂ {0, 1, 2, 3} such that f([x]2) ⊂ {i, j}.
Theorem 10. RCA0 can prove RT(2, 4) with one typical use of RT(2, 2).
Proof. The following proof can be can be carried out in RCA0.
Suppose f : [N]2 → 4. Either there is an infinite x ⊂ N that is 2-mono
for f or there is no such set. If there is such a set, define j = 0, let x be
an increasing enumeration of such a set, and suppose f([x]2) ⊂ {a0, a1}. If
there is no such set, define j = 1 and let x be an increasing enumeration
of N. Define g : [N]2 → 2 by the following:
g(m,n) =


0 if j = 0 and f(x(m), x(n)) = a0
1 if j = 0 and f(x(m), x(n)) = a1
0 if j = 1 and f(x(m), x(n)) ≤ 1
1 if j = 1 and f(x(m), x(n)) ≥ 2.
By one typical application of RT(2, 2), let y be an infinite monochromatic
set for g. If j = 1, then y is an infinite 2-mono set for f , contradicting the
definition of j. Thus j = 0, and the set z = {x(m) | m ∈ y} is an infinite
monochromatic set for f .
Using similar but more complicated constructions, for each standard in-
teger k one can show that RT(2, k) can be proved with a single application of
RT(2, 2) in the classical system RCA0. For example, given f : [N]
2 → 8 either
N contains no infinite 4-mono set, or there is an infinite 4-mono set with no
infinite 2-mono subset, or there is an infinite 2-mono set. Define g based on
these possibilities and proceed as above. Furthermore, examination of the
proof of Theorem 10 reveals no actual use of the exponent. Consequently,
we can extend Theorem 10 as follows.
Corollary 11. Let n and k be positive elements of ω. RCA0 can prove
RT(n, k) with one typical use of RT(n, 2).
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This kind of nonconstructive argument leveraging a single typical use of
an axiom is not limited to Ramsey’s theorem. For example, for each n ∈ ω,
RCA0 can prove “every set has an nth Turing jump” with a single typical use
of “every set has a Turing jump”. Many more examples come to mind, where
a single typical use can be used to iterate a principle any finite number of
times.
The relationship between Weihrauch reducibility and proofs in intuition-
istic systems played an important role in obtaining the results of this section.
We did not discover the proof described in Theorem 10 until our work on
Corollary 4 indicated the significance of the law of the excluded middle in
this setting.
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